Abstract. Violence is one of the leading social problems in both Europe and the United States. The development of appropriate public policies to curtail violence is confounded by the relationship between alcohol and violence. In this article, we estimate the propensity of alcohol control policies to reduce the perpetration and victimization of criminal violence. We measure violence with data on individual-level victimizations from the U.S. National Crime Victimization Survey. We examine the effects of a number of different alcohol control policies in reducing violent crime. These policies include the retail price of beer, drunk driving laws and penalties, keg laws and serving and selling laws. We find some evidence of a negative relationship between alcohol prices and the probability of alcohol-or drug-related assault victimizations. However, we find no strong evidence that other alcohol policies are effective in reducing violent crimes.
INTRODUCTION
A recent report from the World Health Organization (WHO) finds that Europe has the highest level of per capita alcohol consumption in the world, with the United States not far behind (World Health Organization, 2012) . Both regions also have high rates of heavy episodic drinking, the harms from which can include disease, injury, crime and violence. Indeed, the correlation between the consumption of alcoholic beverages and the incidence of violence has been well documented in the United States and in various countries throughout the world (Cnossen, 2007; World Health Organization, 2004) .
Faced with the highest alcohol intake in the world, in 2006, the WHO Regional Office for Europe published a new framework for alcohol control policy in the region, calling on members to engage in actions to reduce and prevent the harm caused by alcohol consumption (World Health Organization, 2006) . To achieve the goals, the WHO advocates a combined policy effort that includes education and information along with restrictions on alcohol availability, including higher taxes and limits on outlets and hours of sales. A similar call to action to reduce the harms from alcohol consumption is found in the United States (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2010) .
In this article, we directly estimate the propensity of alcohol control policies to reduce rates of violent victimization. Using the reduced form policy analysis method of Cook and Tauchen (1982) , we exploit the well-established relationship between alcohol consumption and the exogenous determinants of alcohol demand. We use a large number of alcohol control policies in conjunction with individual-level data on criminal victimizations from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), a nationally representative survey of households in the United States. We find some evidence of a negative relationship between alcohol prices and the probability of alcohol-or drug-related assault victimizations. However, we find no strong evidence that other alcohol policies are effective in reducing violent crime victimization rates.
The reduced form method has been used extensively by researchers in the past to examine the direct effect of alcohol taxes and other alcohol control policies on various types of crime and violence (e.g. Chaloupka and Saffer, 1992; Cook and Moore, 1993; Desimone, 2001; Markowitz, 2005; Matthews et al., 2006) . These studies conclude that higher alcohol prices or taxes are associated with reductions in certain measures of criminal violence. However, the bulk of the previous literature for the United States was conducted using data from the 1980s and 1990s, and is not current with the policy environment. Also, some of these studies only analyze crimes that have been reported to the police and are therefore limited in their generalizability.
There is also evidence that crime rates may rise with a higher density of outlets licensed to sell alcohol, although the research to date on this question focuses on small geographic areas and cannot be generalized to broader areas (Gyimah-Brempong, 2001; Scribner et al., 1995 Scribner et al., , 1999 . Other studies have examined the effects of closing times or allowed days of sale on crimes, but again, these studies are often limited in geography or are results of extraordinary circumstances (see e.g. Biderman et al., 2010; Chikritzhs and Stockwell, 2002; Olsson and Wikstrom, 1982) . We refer the reader to Carpenter and Dobkin (2010) for an in-depth discussion of this literature. 1 The previous literature provides insights into the relationship between alcohol control policies and measures of violent crime, however, much of this research is not current with the alcohol control environment of today. In recent years, real alcohol prices in the United States have been falling as states and the federal government have chosen not to raise alcohol taxes (see Figure 1) . A similar situation exists in the European Union where the real value of the excise duty rates for alcohol in many countries has declined since 1996 (Rabinovich et al., 2009) . Also, most of this literature examines only a few alcohol control policies, mainly excise taxes, with some attention paid to drunk driving laws and availability measures. This is despite a plethora of policies currently used by localities to control alcohol. In the analyses below, we describe and use sixteen different alcohol control policies in conjunction with very recent data on violent victimization for states in the United States.
As a result of changes in alcohol prices and regulations in recent years, it is important to reexamine the findings from previous studies. In this article, we revisit the question of whether or not strict alcohol control policies are associated with criminal violence in the United States. We use the most recent data available and analyze a comprehensive series of alcohol regulatory variables. Our overall conclusion is that an increase in the beer price, which can be achieved through increased taxes, is the most strongly related of all the alcohol control policies to reductions in violence. However, our price effects are only significant at conventional levels when considering the probability of an alcohol-or druginvolved assault. Few conclusions can be drawn for the other alcohol control policies.
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Weighted average beer price Weighted average beer tax Figure 1 State population weighted real average beer price and tax this with area-level alcohol policy information. Descriptions of each data source follows. The NCVS is a nationally representative survey of households focusing on individuals' experiences with criminal victimization. The survey includes a rotating panel of individuals and is administered every six months for a three-year period. Because of the panel design, a person can have from one to six interviews recorded in this data. The publicly available geocoded version of this data is limited to individuals living in the core counties of the 40 largest metropolitan statistical areas (MSA), based on population, and is available for 1994-2004. The samples in each MSA are representative of the population in the core counties. We analyze samples of respondents ages 18 and up to measure violence among adults, and also ages 18-29 to capture violence among young adults at the greatest risk for violence and victimization.
The main dependent variable is an indicator variable of whether or not the individual had been a victim of assault in the past six months. In addition, we created an additional dichotomous dependent variable indicating whether or not the individual reports being a victim of an alcohol or drug involved crime.
2 Similar questions are asked about robbery victimizations, and we create two additional dependent variables for robbery. Victimization rates are fairly low in this data. In a six-month period, a person has a 0.6% chance of being the victim of at least one assault and a 0.2% chance of being the victim of at least one alcohol-or drug-involved assault. Victimization rates are much higher among young adults with rates of 1.2% and 0.5% for the overall and alcohol-or drug-involved victimizations, respectively.
The NCVS also contains some individual-level characteristics including marital status, education and household income. These individual characteristics are also used in the estimation below.
The advantages of the NCVS data are that it directly measures victimization, we can split the sample by age to examine the policy effects for the high-crime age groups (young adults), and that the panel nature of the data allows us to include individual-level fixed effects in the models. Individual fixed effects are important as they help control for unobserved time-invariant characteristics about the individual that may make them more prone to victimization or risky behaviors such as drinking. 
Alcohol control policies
The first alcohol control policy of interest is the price of alcohol, which can be manipulated through legislated excise tax changes. We do not use the alcohol 2. The NCVS asks each respondent who was victimized, 'was the offender drinking or on drugs or don't you know?' A response of 'I don't know' was assigned a missing value for this question. One limitation to this variable is that we do not know whether or not the victim had been drinking at the time of the attack. 3. Data on criminal offenses reported to the police are another potential source of violent crime data. However, offense data may suffer from a reporting bias that is unlikely to be present in the victimization survey. Offense data for the United States are not consistently reported by police precincts, and it is possible that offenses reported (or not reported) are systematically related to alcohol consumption and prices, which could bias the effects of the policies toward zero.
taxes directly in this project because very few states changed their excise taxes during the 2000s. Our methodology requires sufficient variation in the taxes for proper identification of the true effects, and this variation is simply not present. Instead we rely on the retail price of beer from the quarterly ACCRA Cost of Living Index, which exhibits variation not only because of excise taxes, but also because of differences in production and transportation costs. Beer is chosen because it is the most popular beverage in terms of consumption of pure ethanol per capita. The ACCRA beer prices are measured on an MSA-level, so we match the MSAs in ACCRA to the MSAs in the NCVS data. One variable that represents the availability of alcohol is the number of outlets licensed to sell liquor per 1,000 state residents. Data on licensed outlets come from the Adams Liquor Handbook (various years). We caution that alcohol outlets (and prices) can be endogenous in a crime equation if there are unobserved neighborhood characteristics that determine both the level of crime and the price or availability of alcohol. However, the individual-level fixed effects will help mitigate this source of endogeneity since these fixed effects subsume MSAlevel effects.
We include a host of other alcohol control policies gathered from the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism's online data base called the Alcohol Policy Information System (APIS). For the years that were not available online, IMPAQ International, LLC researched state statutes and contacted state officials to provide a continuous time series for these data. We use 16 policy variables within different policy areas, as shown and described in Table 1 . These laws can be broadly grouped into the following: Laws pertaining to the purchase of kegs, drunk driving laws, laws pertaining to serving and selling alcohol, Sunday sales, open container laws and miscellaneous laws pertaining to underage drinking.
The details of laws regulating the sale and availability of alcohol are complex and vary from state to state, and we refer the reader to the APIS for specific details, but some of the main ones are summarized here for clarity.
Keg and open container laws
In the United States, retailers may sell kegs of beer, but many states impose restrictions on the sale in the form of deposits and identification requirements. For example, kegs may be tagged with identifying information about the purchaser, and many states have laws preventing the destruction of these labels. Many states, but not all, also have 'open container laws' that prohibit open containers (cans or bottles) of alcohol in vehicles. State laws vary as to the details of the prohibition, including whether or not the prohibition applies to the passenger and driver, and the type of beverage applicable. The U.S. Federal Government has provided states with incentives to adopt a set of six criteria that constitute the federal standard. We include as a policy variable an indicator for whether the state has adopted the federal standard in designing its open container law.
Drunk driving laws
The primary drunk driving law pertains to the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limit for adults. The current BAC limit in all states is 0.08, but this stan- dard has changed over time from a previous limit of 0.10. All states also currently have a much stricter, zero-tolerance policy for drinkers who are under the legal age of 21. While we cannot use this particular policy because of lack of variation, we do observe variation in the penalty imposed by states on underage drinking and driving in the form of a suspension or revocation of driving privileges. Additional variation comes from differences in the age at which these penalties pertain. These are the variables named 'Drivers license loss age 18 or 19' and 'Drivers license loss age 21'.
Serving and selling laws
It is common in the United States for underage drinkers to obtain false documentation ('fake IDs') with false birthdates to gain entrance to bars. The variable 'Count of fake ID support' is the number of support provisions given to retailers to help identify these false documents. Examples include distinctive licenses for underage drinkers, incentives for using electronic license scanners, and allowances for seizing the fake ID and detaining the minor. States further have mandatory training laws for servers or provide incentives for voluntary training for preventing sales to minors or to intoxicated people. The presence or absence of these laws is found in the variables 'Mandatory training' and 'Incentives for voluntary training'.
Underage laws
All states have laws prohibiting the possession of alcohol by minors and furnishing of alcohol to minors, but some states allow exceptions to these laws. Examples include furnishing by family members and possession when a family member is present. Exceptions to both laws may be applicable in different locations such as any private location or only in the home. Many states also have laws that impose liability for adults who host underage drinking parties (termed 'Hosting policy'), and these laws come with exceptions similar to those for possession and furnishing. The NCVS data identify the MSA in which respondents reside, so we merged the alcohol regulatory policies to the individuals' MSA and state of residence based on the date of interview. When MSAs cross state lines, we used a population weighted average of the alcohol policies from the relevant states.
Other determinants of crime
To control for other geographic characteristics likely to be associated with crime, we gather information on state prison incarceration rates, the state real income per capita, the state unemployment rate, the percentage of the state population ages 15-24, the percentage of the state population that is black, the percentage of the state population ages 25 years and over that has obtained a bachelor's degree, and the percent of the state living in rural areas. State spending on police comes from the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Data on prison populations by state come from the Bureau of Justice Statistics' National Corrections Reporting Program. Per capita income comes from the Department of Commerce, and unemployment comes from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The other state demographics come from the U.S. Census Bureau.
METHODS
The analytical framework starts with the proposition that violence is related to alcohol consumption. Consumption, in turn, is determined by the exogenous determinants of consumption. By substituting out consumption and replacing this with the beer price and other alcohol control policies, we arrive at the reduced form equation that shows the direct relationship between the policies and the incidence of violence:
In the models below, we estimate equation 1 where an act of violence (V) at time (t), is a function of the full price of alcohol (P A ); law enforcement variables which may affect consumption through the enforcement of alcohol-related laws (E), and are lagged to avoid structural endogeneity; individual and area-level characteristics that may determine alcohol consumption or violence (X), and (e) is an error term. In an online appendix, we provide more background on the derivation of equation 1. Including individual-level fixed effects will account for time-invariant, unmeasured characteristics in the error term, and omitted individual characteristics will not be problematic so long as these are uncorrelated with the components of the full price of alcohol, including the alcohol related laws, the variables of interest in this study. We estimate the models using linear probability models with individual-level fixed effects and clustered standard errors by MSA (Bertrand et al., 2004) .
The individual fixed effects models rely on sufficient temporal variation in the variables for proper estimation. Table 1 shows the average values of the policy variables that existed in the first and last years of the data. This table reveals clear changes in these averages over time, indicating the presence of intertemporal variation.
The task of including and accounting for the variety of alcohol control policies in a regression model is rather difficult given that we have collected 16 different policies. We approach this in a variety of ways that are designed to minimize the potential for both omitted variable bias and multicollinearity. First, we specify a base equation that includes the price of beer and the number of liquor outlets per capita. These variables are chosen following from the previous literature, and because they represent the most popular regulations among states and exhibit variation across states and time. We subsequently add other policy variables to the base models. Not all variables collected are presented in the tables of results below, although these additional results are available upon request. The specific variables included in each model were chosen to minimize the potential for collinearity between the variables. However, these models may suffer from omitted variable bias, and we therefore develop alternative methods to include the alcohol policy variables. First, we generate an index that sums the dichotomous variables representing a restriction on alcohol and subtract the variables that represent a lack of restriction. In alternative specifications, we test the Alcohol and Criminal Violence © 2012 The Authors German Economic Review © 2012 Verein für Socialpolitik sum of the restrictions and the sum of the lack of restrictions as separate indexes. Unfortunately, the indexes explain almost no variation in the outcomes and are rarely statistically significant, and therefore are not shown.
Our second alternative method of including the alcohol control policy variables is through the use of tetrachoric principal component analysis (TPCA). This procedure is a type of principal component analysis (PCA) designed for binary variables. As with standard PCA, the TPCA is a variable reduction method that extracts 'principal components' as linear combinations of optimally weighted observed variables. We conduct this analysis using the time period corresponding to that of the NCVS (1994 NCVS ( -2004 and data from all 50 states. We generate new variables containing the extracted factors, the number of which depends on the resulting cumulative proportion of the explained variation (using 0.75 as a cutoff value). The factors are then included as variables in the regression models.
We show two models with the constructed factors. The first contains the factors from drunk driving laws, keg/open container laws and selling and serving laws. The second contains a broader grouping of variables and represents the restrictive variables and exceptions to laws. The generated factors have low correlations with each other so including the factors from the different groupings of variables is not problematic. More details of the construction of the TPCA and all the factor loadings are available in an online appendix, while Table 2 contains the loadings for the broad grouping of restrictive variables and exceptions.
In interpreting the results, we caution that there may be potential endogeneity problems with all the price and alcohol policy variables, to the extent that unobserved, time-varying factors may be in the error term and correlated with both the policies and criminal violence. The fixed effects will help mitigate any time-invariant correlation, and the TCPA also minimizes this potential correlation. Nevertheless, our results should be treated as associations. 4. RESULTS Table 3 shows summary statistics for the NCVS data and select alcohol policy variables. About 0.6% of the sample reports an assault in a six-month period, and 0.2% of the sample reports alcohol-or drug-involved assaults. The average real beer price measured in 1982-84 dollars is $3.64 per 6-pack. On average, there is one licensed liquor outlet for every 1,000 population, and about 30% of the sample resides in states that require information for keg purchases. About half of the respondents live in states that have the strictest laws pertaining to drunk driving, while fewer states impose mandatory training and other types of restrictions on sales and hosting. Tables 4 and 5 show the effects of the alcohol policies on self-reported assaults, and alcohol-or drug-related assaults, respectively, for individuals age 18 and over. The full regression results can be found in an online appendix. The tables show marginal effects from linear probability models with individual fixed effects. Many of our coefficients are very small in magnitude, so we multiply all coefficients by 100 to ease the interpretation in all tables. T-statistics calculated from standard errors clustered at the MSA-level are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable in each specification is an indicator variable for whether an individual was the victim of an assault in the previous six months.
In Table 4 , the coefficients on the real beer price are negative, but statistically insignificant. The magnitude indicates that a $1.00 increase in the real price of beer is associated with about a 0.07 percentage point decrease in an individual's probability of being assaulted in a six-month period, or a reduction in the mean from 0.6% to 0.53% (representing about a 12% reduction in the mean). The coefficients on the alcohol policy variables are also small and mostly insignificant, and policies such as high keg deposits and mandatory serving or selling training requirements are associated with increased assaults, contrary to expectations. Only the variable representing conforming to federal standards regarding open container laws is negatively and statistically related to the probability of assaults. Table 5 restricts the dependent variable to self-reported assaults involving observed alcohol or drug use by the offender. In Table 5 , the coefficients on the real beer price are negative and achieve statistical significance at the 10% level in a two-tailed test in all but one model. Here, a $1.00 increase in the real beer price is associated with about a 0.06% point decrease in an individual's probability of being assaulted in a six-month period. This translates to a 30% reduction in alcohol-or drug-involved assaults off of the mean of 0.2. The similarity in the magnitude of the marginal effects here and in Table 4 suggests that the results for all assault are being driven primarily by that of alcohol-and drug-related assaults. This makes sense since the portion of assaults that are not related to alcohol consumption should not be altered by changes in an alcoholic beverage price. Most other alcohol control policies do not have much effect on alcoholor drug-related assaults. As with the probability of assaults, mandatory serving or selling training requirements are associated with increased alcohol-or drugrelated assaults. However, incentives for voluntary training are associated with decreased alcohol-or drug-related assaults.
With regard to the results for alcohol-related violence, we caution that a change in an alcohol policy can cause a change in consumption and a corresponding change in violence, or may lead to a change in consumption without changing violence. But given the construction of this particular dependent variable, so long as alcohol consumption is altered by a policy, both these cases will be reflected in our results. It is difficult to know which case we observe, but to help figure it out, we run two supplementary analyses (available upon request). In the first, we compare the probability of being a victim of drug-and alcohol-related violence to the group of non-victims only and we find results practically identical to those shown in the tables. In the second, we compare the probability being a victim of drug-and alcohol-related violence to the group of victims who reported observing no drugs or alcohol involvement. Here, the beer price coefficients are statistically insignificant in all models, providing some evidence that any reduction in consumption from a beer price change goes concurrently with a decrease in violence. These results in Tables 4 and 5 are generally confirmed by the TPCA shown in Table 6 . The first two columns in Table 6 show results for all assaults, and here, the beer price is negative but not statistically significant. The second two columns show results for alcohol-or drug-related assaults. Here, the beer price coefficients are negative and of similar magnitude to the coefficients in Table 5 with the statistical significance hovering around the 10% level. As for the factors, a few are significant at the 10% level for all assaults (see the coefficients for selling, kegs and restrictions). However, most signs are positive, reflecting some of the positive signs seen in Table 4 . Only the coefficient on the first factor for restrictions is negative, indicating that restrictive policies as a group may be useful in reducing violence. Many of the policies load equally in to this factor, so it is difficult to attribute this effect to a few types of policies. This result also becomes a bit questionable as the third factor for restrictive policies displays a positive relationship with assaults. This third factor is also comprised of many of the same policies.
The results for the TCPA coefficients in the models for alcohol-or drug-related assaults also yield mixed conclusions. Here, factors for selling and kegs are statistically significant, with selling and the second keg factor (which loads most heavily on the keg deposit) positive and significant, contrary to expectations. The first keg factor, which loads on all three keg policies, is negative and statistically significant, indicating that the combination of these restrictions may be effective in reducing alcohol-or drug-related assaults. However, the broader groupings of restricted policies show no statistical relationship with alcohol-or drug-related assaults.
In Table 7 , we show select models for assault victimizations among those ages 18-29. The results are similar to the previous tables in that the coefficients on the beer price are negative for assaults and alcohol-or drug-related assaults but only nearly statistically significant for the latter outcome. The magnitudes are much larger, ranging from 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points. This provides some evidence that the results from the all victims sample are being driven primarily by the behaviors of the young adult sample. There are two other policies of interest in this table. The first is the coefficient on the number of licensed liquor outlets. This coefficient is positive and significant in both of the alcohol-or drug-related assault models, indicating that more outlets are associated with more of this type of violence. We again caution that endogeneity may be a problem here if time-varying factors affect both the location of outlets and the occurrence of crime. The second result of interest is the penalty of loss of driver's license up to age 21. The coefficients on this variable are negative and significant in both types of victimization models, indicating that this policy is associated with a reduction in drinking and violence among young people. Also of interest is that the broad Notes. N = 542,353 in the all assaults models and 538,440 in the alcohol-or drug-involved assaults models. Coefficients from linear probability models with individual fixed effects are shown. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. T-statistics in parentheses is based on MSAlevel clustered standard errors. Models also include controls for age, marital status, education, income, the percent of the state's population living in rural areas, the state unemployment rate, the percent of the state with a bachelor's degree, state income per capita, the percent population age 15-24, the percent population that is black, lagged state per capita police expenditures, lagged state incarceration rates and indicator variables for the survey year.
groupings of restricted policies show no statistical relationship with either definition of assaults. The models for robbery corresponding to the assault models shown in Tables 4  through 7 were tested, but are not shown for brevity, but are available upon request. In the individual fixed effects models, almost none of the alcohol policy coefficients are significant predictors of robbery victimizations. This statement holds for robbery victimization for all ages, ages 18-29, and for alcohol-or druginvolved robberies. These results are not surprising since robbery has a complex relationship with alcohol in that income producing crimes may be committed to support an alcohol habit. An inelastic demand for alcohol would result in a positive relationship between alcohol prices and robbery. This would mitigate any negative relationship between alcohol prices and the violent aspect of robbery. We refer the reader to Markowitz (2005) for a complete discussion of this issue. Notes. N = 96,739 in the all assaults models and 95,508 in the alcohol-or drug-involved assaults models. Coefficients from linear probability models with individual fixed effects are shown. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. T-statistics in parentheses is based on MSA-level clustered standard errors. Models also include controls for age, marital status, education, income, the percent of the state's population living in rural areas, the state unemployment rate, the percent of the state with a bachelor's degree, state income per capita, the percent population age 15-24, the percent population that is black, lagged state per capita police expenditures, lagged state incarceration rates and indicator variables for the survey year.
ROBUSTNESS
In this section, we discuss checks of the robustness of our results. Tables pertaining to the results discussed here can be found in an online appendix. First, we run a parsimonious specification where we drop all state and individual-level variables and include only the alcohol control policies and the individual fixed effects. We do this since as many of the individual-level variables do not vary much over time and may be extraneous to some degree. The results from these checks are consistent with those in the main tables of results, indicating that omitting the state and individual level time-varying factors has almost no influence on the alcohol control policies. Such a result is expected when the alcohol policies are exogenous to these characteristics. Second, we return to the fully specified model, but include MSA-level fixed effects in place of the individual-level fixed effects. This should add in more 'within' variation to the models and more efficient estimation. This change does not alter the coefficients on the alcohol control policies, but does add precision to the models by decreasing the standard errors.
Last, we run a fully specified model, but use random effects rather than fixed effects. The random effects model is appropriate when the unobserved individual effect is uncorrelated with the other included variables. If this assumption does not hold, the random effects model yields inconsistent estimates and a fixed effect model is preferred. A Hausman test of the consistency of the random effects rejects the random effects models in all specifications, so we prefer the results from the fixed effects specifications (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009 ). Nevertheless, the results from the random effects models are similar to the fixed effects models with only a few exceptions.
Many studies in the economics literature have estimated a demand equation for alcohol, and although there is strong evidence that consumption responds to price, there is less available information on some of the other policies we examine in this article (See Cook, 2007 , for a review). Since exact measures of the alcohol consumption of the perpetrator and/or victim are not available in the NCVS, we use state-level data on per capita ethanol sales (based on population age 14 and up) available from the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. We restrict the sample to those states that appear in the NCVS data to make the two sets of results more comparable. We caution that although we include state-fixed effects to control for unobserved, time-invariant factors, the estimates suffer from the simultaneous equation bias problem since the state-level price and quantities sold are determined simultaneously. Usually, a valid instrument, such as taxes can be used to avoid the bias, but as noted above, alcohol taxes rarely changed during the time period of this study and are not useful in this case. Therefore, the results are, at best, suggestive of the negative relationship price and consumption. In these models, the coefficients on the beer price are negative and significant, and indicate that a one dollar increase in the real beer price is associated with a reduction in ethanol sales of around 0.04 gallons (or approximately 5 ounces) per capita. None of the other alcohol policy variable achieves statistical significance at the 5% level. Although these results are only suggestive, they do corroborate the results of the reduced form violence equations.
CONCLUSION
This article provides new evidence of the relationships between alcohol prices, alcohol policies and crime in the United States. We examine self-reported victimization data to estimate the occurrence of violence that is both reported and not reported to authorities. This data also allow us to identify the crimes that are related to alcohol consumption and therefore more likely to be affected by changes in alcohol control policies. We also examine the effects of policies on violent victimization among young adults ages 18-29. This is the age group that is most likely to be involved in criminal activity (accounting for 40-48% of all arrests in any given year). 4 We combine the measures of violence with a large number of alcohol control policies that varied considerably over the 1990s and early 2000s. We enter the policies directly in the regressions and indirectly through a principal components analysis. Results from either method corroborate each other. However, there are a few limitations to our study. First, we only examine self-reports of violent victimization. The data do not include information on perpetration, or events where violence may be reciprocal, such as fights. Second, the fixed effects are valid for capturing unobserved, time-invariant factors that may confound the relationship between alcohol policies and violence. However, we will not capture time-varying effects, although given the short time period represented by the fixed effects (three years), this should not be a problem.
Our overall conclusion from this article is that an increase in the beer price, which can be achieved through increased taxes, is the most effective of all the alcohol control policies to reduce violence. However, beer taxes are excise taxes that are a fixed dollar amount per volume of alcohol, and there have been very few states that have increased these taxes in recent years. This has contributed to an overall drop in real beer prices over the period of our study. Our results imply that an increase in excise taxes could lead to a reduction in some assaults. Our price effects are only significant at conventional levels when considering the probability of an alcohol-or drug-involved assault.
Few conclusions can be drawn for the other alcohol control policies. Some of the observed relationships include the following: (1) The loss of driver's license up to age 21 as a penalty for drunk driving is negatively associated with violent victimization among young adults. (2) Open container laws that meet federal standards are associated with a reduced probability of assault victimization. (3) The presence of incentives for voluntary beverage server training programs is associated with a reduced probability of assault victimization, although mandatory training is unexpectedly positively associated with the probability of assault victimization. It is not clear why a positive relationship would exist. This is a question for future research.
The factor analysis used to condense and summarize the policies is more informative than the mixed results from the policies themselves. We find that on the whole, the group of restrictive alcohol beverage control policies is ineffective in altering violence rates. Although some policies may be effective in reducing the demand for alcohol, or in reducing other undesirable outcomes related to drinking, such as drunk driving, our results show that broadly summarized restrictive policies are not associated with reductions in violence. Increases in the beer price through increases in excise taxes are likely to be much more effective in reducing violence than other forms of alcohol beverage control.
